One Measure By Which Things Have Recently Gotten Worse

The United Nation’s refugee agency today released its annual report on people displaced by war around the world, and the news is bad:

The number of people forcibly displaced at the end of 2014 had risen to a staggering 59.5 million compared to 51.2 million a year earlier and 37.5 million a decade ago.

The increase represents the biggest leap ever seen in a single year. Moreover, the report said the situation was likely to worsen still further.

The report focuses on raw estimates of displaced persons, but I think it makes more sense to look at this group as a share of world population. The number of people on the planet has increased by more than half a billion in the past decade, so we might expect to see some growth in the number of forcibly displaced persons even if the amount of conflict worldwide had held steady. The chart below plots annual totals from the UNHCR report as a share of mid-year world population, as estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau (here).

unhcr.refugee.trends

The number of observations in this time series is too small to use Bayesian change point detection to estimate the likelihood that the upturn after 2012 marks a change in the underlying data-generating process. I’m not sure we need that kind of firepower, though. After holding more or less steady for at least six years, the share of world population forcibly displaced by war has increased by more than 50 percent in just two years, from about one of every 200 people to 1 of every 133 people. Equally important, reports from field workers indicate that this problem only continues to grow in 2015. I don’t think I would call this upturn a “paradigm change,” as UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres did, but there is little doubt that the problem of displacement by war has worsened significantly since 2012.

In historical terms, just how bad is it? Unfortunately, it’s impossible to say for sure. The time series in the UNHCR report only starts in 2004, and a note warns that methodological changes in 2007 render the data before that year incomparable to the more recent estimates. The UNHCR describes the 2014 figure as “the highest level ever recorded,” and that’s technically true but not very informative when recording started only recently. A longer time series assembled by the Center for Systemic Peace (here) supports the claim that the latest raw estimate is the largest ever, but as a share of world population, it’s probably still a bit lower than the levels seen in the post–Cold War tumult of the early 1990s (see here).

Other relevant data affirm the view that, while clearly worsening, the intensity of armed conflict around the world is not at historically high levels, not even for the past few decades. Here is a plot of annual counts of battle-related deaths (low, high, and best estimates) according to the latest edition of UCDP’s data set on that topic (here), which covers the period 1989–2013. Note that these figures have not been adjusted for changes in world population.

Annual estimates of battle-related deaths worldwide, 1989-2013 (data source: UCDP)

Annual estimates of battle-related deaths worldwide, 1989-2013 (data source: UCDP)

We see similar pattern in the Center for Systemic Peace’s Major Episodes of Political Violence data set (second row here), which covers the whole post-WWII period. For the chart below, I have separately summed the data set’s scalar measure of conflict intensity for two types of conflict, civil and interstate (see the codebook for details). Like the UCDP data, these figures show a local increase in the past few years that nevertheless remains well below the prior peak, which came when the Soviet Union fell apart.

Annual intensity of political violence worldwide, 1946-2014 (data source: CSP)

Annual intensity of political violence worldwide, 1946-2014 (data source: CSP)

And, for longer-term perspective, it always helps to take another look at this one, from an earlier UCDP report:

PRIO battle death trends

I’ll wrap this up by pinning a note in something I see when comparing the shorter-term UCDP estimates to the UNHCR estimates on forcibly displaced persons: adjusting for population, it looks like armed conflicts may be killing fewer but displacing more than they used to. That impression is bolstered by a glance at UCDP data on trends in deaths from “intentional attacks on civilians by governments and formally organized armed groups,” which UCDP calls “one-sided violence” (here).  As the plot below shows, the recent upsurge in warfare has not yet produced a large increase in the incidence of these killings, either. The line is bending upward, but it remains close to historical lows.

Estimated annual deaths from one-sided violence, 1989-2013 (Source: UCDP)

Estimated annual deaths from one-sided violence, 1989-2013 (Source: UCDP)

So, in the tumult of the past few years, it looks like the rate of population displacement has surged while the rate of battle deaths has risen more slowly and the rate of one-sided violence targeting civilians hasn’t risen much at all. If that’s true, then why? Improvements in medical care in conflict zones are probably part of the story, but I wonder if changes in norms and values, and in the international institutions and practices instantiating them, aren’t also shaping these trends. Governments that in the past might have wantonly killed populations they regarded as threats now seem more inclined to press those populations by other means—not always, but more often. Meanwhile, international organizations are readier than ever to assist those groups under pressure by feeding and sheltering them, drawing attention to their miseries, and sometimes even protecting them. The trend may be fragile, and the causality is impossible to untangle with confidence, but it deserves contemplation.

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Polity Meets Joy Division

The Center for Systemic Peace posted its annual update of the Polity data set on Friday, here. The data set now covers the period 1800–2014.

For those of you who haven’t already fled the page to go download the data and who aren’t political scientists: Polity measures patterns of political authority in all countries with populations larger than 500,000. It is one of the mostly widely used data sets in the fields of comparative politics and international relations. Polity is also tremendously useful in forecasts of rare political crises—partly because it measures some very important things, but also because it is updated every year on a fairly predictable schedule. Thanks to PITF and CSP for that.

I thought I would mark the occasion by visualizing Polity in a new way (for me, at least). In the past, I’ve used heat maps (here and here) and line plots of summary statistics. This time, I wanted to try something other than a heat map that would show change over time in a distribution, instead of just a central tendency. Weakly inspired by the often-imitated cover of Joy Division’s 1979 album, here’s what I got. Each line in this chart is a kernel density plot of one year’s Polity scores, which range from -10 to 10 and are meant to indicate how democratic a country’s politics are. The small number of cases with special codes that don’t fit on this scale (-66, -77, and -88) have been set aside.

polity.meets.joy.division

The chart shows once again that the world has become much more democratic in the past half-century, with most of those gains occurring in the past 30 years. In the early 1960s, the distribution of national political regimes was bimodal, but authoritarian regimes outnumbering the more-democratic ones. As recently as the early 1970s, most regimes still fell toward the authoritarian end of the scale. Starting in the late 1980s, though, the authoritarian peak eroded quickly, and the balance of the distribution shifted toward the democratic end. Despite continuing talk of a democratic recession, the (political) world in 2014 is still mostly composed of relatively democratic regimes, and this data set doesn’t show much change in that basic pattern over the past decade.

 

An Updated Look at Trends in Political Violence

The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) has just posted an updated version of its Major Episodes of Political Violence data set, which now covers the period 1946-2014. That data set includes scalar measures of the magnitude of several forms of political violence between and within states. Per the codebook (PDF):

Magnitude scores reflect multiple factors including state capabilities, interactive intensity (means and goals), area and scope of death and destruction, population displacement, and episode duration. Scores are considered to be consistently assigned (i.e., comparable) across episode types and for all states directly involved.

For each country in each year, the magnitude scores range from 0 to 10. The chart below shows annual global sums of those scores for conflicts between and within states (i.e., the INTTOT and CIVTOT columns in the source data).

mepv.intensity.by.year

Consistent with other measures, CSP’s data show an increase in violent political conflict in the past few years. At the same time, those data also indicate that, even at the end of 2014, the scale of conflict worldwide remained well below the peak levels observed in the latter decades of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. That finding provides no comfort to the people directly affected by the fighting ongoing today. Still, it should (but probably won’t) throw another blanket over hyperbolic statements about the world being more unstable than ever before.

If we look at the trends by region, we see what most avid newsreaders would expect to see. The chart below uses the U.S. State Department’s regional designations. It confirms that the recent increase in conflict within states (the orange lines) has mostly come from Africa and the Middle East. Conflicts persist in the Americas and East and South Asia, but their magnitude has generally diminished in recent years. Europe and Eurasia supplies the least violent conflict of any region, but the war in Ukraine—designated a civil conflict by this source and assigned a magnitude score of 2—increased that supply in 2014.

mepv.intensity.by.year.and.region

CSP saw almost no interstate conflict around the world in 2014. The global score of 1 accrues from U.S. operations in Afghanistan. When interstate conflict has occurred in the post–Cold War period, it has mostly come from Africa and the Middle East, too, but East Asia was also a major contributor as recently as the 1980s.

For a complete list of the episodes of political violence observed by CSP in this data set, go here. For CSP’s analysis of trends in these data, go here.

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