1. A gaggle of researchers at Penn State, including Phil Schrodt, have posted a new conference paper (PDF) showing how they are using computer-generated data on political interactions around the world (the oft-mentioned GDELT) to forecast various forms of political crisis with respectable accuracy.
One important finding from their research so far: models that mix dynamic data on political interactions with slow-changing data on relevant structural conditions (political, social, economic) produce more accurate forecasts than models that use only one or the other. That’s not surprising, but it is a useful confirmation nonetheless. Thanks to GDELT’s public release, I predict that we’ll see a lot more social-science modelers doing that kind of mixing in the near future.
2. Kaiser Fung reviews Predictive Analytics, a book by Eric Siegel. I haven’t read it, but Kaiser’s review makes me think it would be a good addition to my short list of recommended readings for forecasters.
3. Finally, the 2013 edition of the Failed States Index (FSI) is now up on Foreign Policy‘s web site (here). I call it out here to air a few grievances.
First, it makes me a little crazy that it’s hard to pin down exactly what this index is supposed to do. Is FSI meant to summarize recent conditions or to help forecast new troubles down the road? In their explication of the methodology behind it, the makers of the FSI acknowledge that it’s the largely former but also slide into describing it as an early-warning tool. And what exactly is “state failure,” anyway? They never quite say, which makes it hard to use the index as either a snapshot or a forecast.
Second, as I’ve said before on this blog, I’m also not a big fan of indices that roll up so many different things into a single value on the basis of assumptions alone. Statistical models also combine a lot of information, but they do so with weights that are derived from a systematic exploration of empirical evidence. FSI simply assumes all of its 12 components are equally relevant when there’s ample opportunity to check that assumption against the historical record. Maybe some of the index’s components are more informative than others, so why not use models to try to find out?
Last but not least, on the way FSI is presented, I think the angry reactions it elicits (see comments on previous editions or my Twitter feed whenever FSI is released) are a useful reminder of the risks of presenting rank-ordered lists based on minor variations in imprecise numbers. People spend a lot of time venting about relatively small differences between states (e.g., “Why is Ethiopia two notches higher than Syria?”) when those aren’t very informative, and aren’t really meant to be. I’ve run into the same problem when I’ve posted statistical forecasts of things like coup attempts and nonviolent uprisings, and I’m increasingly convinced that those rank-ordered lists are a distraction. To use the results without fetishizing the numbers, we might do better to focus on the counter-intuitive results (surprises) and on cases whose scores change a lot across iterations.